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Abstract—This paper investigates the privacy amplification
problem, and compares the existing two bounds: the exponential
bound derived by one of the authors and the min-entropy bound
derived by Renner. It turns out that the exponential bound is
better than the min-entropy bound when a security parameter
is rather small for a block length, and that the min-entropy
bound is better than the exponential bound when a security
parameter is rather large for a block length. Furthermore, we
present another bound that interpolates the exponential bound
and the min-entropy bound by a hybrid use of the Re´nyi entropy
and the inf-spectral entropy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The privacy amplification [1] is a technique to distill a secret
key from a source that is partially known to an eavesdropper,
usually referred to as Eve. The privacy amplification is re-
garded as an indispensable tool in the information theoretic
security, and it has been studied in many literatures (eg. [2],
[3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]).
Recently, the non-asymptotic analysis of coding problems
has attracted considerable attention [9], [10]. Especially for the
channel coding problem, the relation between various types of
non-asymptotic bounds are extensively compared in [10].
The performance of the privacy amplification is typically
characterized by the smooth minimum entropy or the inf-
spectral entropy [2], [11], [8]. There is also another approach,
the exponential bound, which has been investigated by one of
the authors [7]. So far, the relation between non-asymptotic
bounds derived by these two approaches has not been clarified.
The first purpose of this paper is to compare the min-entropy
bound, which is derived by the smooth minimum entropy
framework, and the exponential bound. Actually, it turns out
that the exponential bound is better than the min-entropy
bound when a security parameter is rather small for a block
length. In the following, we explain a reason for this result.
In the achievability part of the smooth entropy framework
[2] or the information spectrum approach [12], a performance
criterion of a problem, such as an error probability or a security
parameter, is usually upper bounded by a formula consisting of
two terms. One of the terms is caused by the smoothing error,
which corresponds to a tail probability of atypical outcomes.
The other is caused by typical outcomes. In the following, let
us call the former one the type 1 error term and the latter one
the type 2 error term respectively.
To derive a tight bound in total, we need to tightly bound
both the type 1 and type 2 error terms. This fact has been
recognized in literatures. Indeed, one of the authors derived
the state-of-the-art error exponent for the classical-quantum
channel coding by tightly bounding both types of error terms
[13]. In [10], Polyanskiy et. al. derived a non-asymptotic
bound of the channel coding, which is called the DT bound,
by tightly bounding both types of error terms. The DT bound
remarkably improves on the so-called Feinstein bound because
the type 2 error term is loosely bounded in the Feinstein bound.
The improvement is especially remarkable when a required
error probability is rather small for a block length.
For the privacy amplification problem, one of the authors
derived the state-of-the-art exponent of the variational distance
by tightly bounding both types of error terms [7]. On the other
hand, the type 2 error term is loosely bounded in the bound
derived via the smooth minimum entropy [2].
As is expected from the above argument, the exponential
bound turns out to be better than the min-entropy bound when
a security parameter is rather small for a block length. For
rather large security parameters, the min-entropy bound is
better than the exponential bound. This is because we derive
the exponential bound by using the large deviation technique
[14]. The large deviation technique is only tight when a
threshold of a tail probability is away from the average, and
this is not the case when a security parameter is rather large
for a block length. As the second purpose of this paper, we
derive a bound that interpolates the exponential bound and
the min-entropy bound. This is done by a hybrid use of the
Re´nyi entropy and the inf-spectral entropy. It turns out that the
hybrid bound is better than both the exponential bound and the
min-entropy bound for whole ranges of security parameters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we summarize known bounds on the privacy amplification.
In Section III, we propose a novel bound by using the
Re´nyi entropy and the inf-spectral entropy. In Section IV, we
compare the bounds numerically.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the problem setting and known
results on the privacy amplification. Although most of results
in this section were stated explicitly or implicitly in literatures,
we restate them for reader’s convenience. Especially, Theorem
1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3 are classical analogue of those
obtained in [8] for the quantum setting, where the distance to
evaluate the smoothing is different.
A. Problem Formulation
For a set A, let P(A) be the set of all probability distribution
on A. It is also convenient to introduce the set P¯(A) of all
sub-normalized non-negative functions.
Let PXZ ∈ P¯(X × Z) be a sub-normalized non-negative
function. For a function f : X → S and the key S = f(X),
let
PSZ(s, z) =
∑
x∈f−1(s)
PXZ(x, z).
We define the security by
d(f |PXZ) = d(PSZ , PS¯ × PZ),
where PS¯ is the uniform distribution on S and
d(P,Q) :=
1
2
∑
a
|P (a)−Q(a)| (1)
for P,Q ∈ P¯(A).
Although the quantity d(f |PXZ) has no operational mean-
ing for unnormalized PXZ , it will be used to derive bounds
on d(f |PXZ) for normalized PXZ . For distribution PXZ ∈
P(X ×Z) and security parameter ε ≥ 0, we are interested in
characterizing
ℓ(PXZ , ε) = sup{log |S| : ∃f : X → S s.t. d(f |PXZ) ≤ ε}.
B. Min Entropy Framework
In this section, we review the smooth minimum entropy
framework that was mainly introduced and developed by
Renner and his collaborators [2], [3], [15], [16], [4].
Definition 1: For PXZ ∈ P¯(X×Z) and a normalized RZ ∈
P(Z), we define
Hmin(PXZ |RZ) = − log max
x∈X
z∈supp(RZ )
PXZ(x, z)
RZ(z)
.
Then, we define
H¯εmin(PXZ |RZ) = max
QXZ∈B¯ε(PXZ )
Hmin(QXZ |RZ),
where
B¯ε(PXZ) =
{
QXZ ∈ P¯(X × Z) : d(PXZ , QXZ) ≤ ε
}
.
We also define
Hεmin(PXZ |RZ) = max
QXZ∈Bε(PXZ )
Hmin(QXZ |RZ),
where
Bε(PXZ) = {QXZ ∈ P(X × Z) : d(PXZ , QXZ) ≤ ε} .
The following is a key lemma to derive every lower bound
on ℓ(PXZ , ε).
Lemma 1 (Leftover Hash:[2]): Let F be the uniform ran-
dom variable on a set of universal 2 hash family F . Then, for
PXZ ∈ P¯(X × Z) and RZ ∈ P(Z), we have1
EF [d(F |PXZ)] ≤
1
2
√
|S|e−H2(PXZ |RZ),
1Technically, RZ must be such that supp(PZ ) ⊂ supp(RZ ).
where
H2(PXZ |RZ) = − log
∑
x∈X
z∈supp(RZ )
PXZ(x, z)
2
RZ(z)
is the conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 2 relative to RZ .
Since H2(PXZ |RZ) ≥ Hmin(PXZ |RZ), we have the fol-
lowing.
Corollary 1: For PXZ ∈ P¯(X × Z) and RZ ∈ P(Z), we
have
EF [d(F |PXZ)] ≤
1
2
√
|S|e−Hmin(PXZ |RZ).
Furthermore, since
d(PXZ |f) ≤ 2ε+ d(P¯XZ |f)
holds for P¯XZ ∈ B¯ε(PXZ) by the triangular inequality, we
have the following.
Corollary 2: For PXZ ∈ P(X × Z) and RZ ∈ P(Z), we
have
EF [d(F |PXZ)] ≤ 2ε+
1
2
√
|S|e−H¯
ε
min(PXZ |RZ).
The following is a key lemma to derive a upper bound on
ℓ(PXZ , ε).
Lemma 2 (Monotonicity): For any function f : X → S,
PXZ ∈ P(X × Z), and RZ ∈ P(Z), we have
Hεmin(PSZ |RZ) ≤ H
ε
min(PXZ |RZ).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1: When Eve’s side-information is the quantum
density operator instead of the random variable, the mono-
tonicity of the smooth minimum entropy was proved in [8,
Proposition 3], where the smoothing is evaluated by the so-
called purified distance instead of the trace distance. For
the quantum setting and the trace distance, it is not clear
whether the monotonicity holds or not because we cannot
apply Uhlmann’s theorem to the trace distance directly.
From Corollary 2 and Lemma 2, we get the following lower
and upper bounds on ℓ(PXZ , ε).
Theorem 1: For any 0 < η ≤ ε, we have
max
RZ∈P(Z)
H¯
(ε−η)/2
min (PXZ |RZ) + log 4η
2 − 1
≤ ℓ(PXZ , ε)
≤ Hεmin(PXZ |PZ).
C. Information Spectrum Approach
In this section, we introduce the inf-spectral entropy. The
quantity is used to calculate the lower and upper bounds in
Theorem 1.
Definition 2: For PXZ ∈ P(X × Z) and 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1, let
Hεs (PXZ |RZ)
:= sup
{
r : PXZ
{
− log
PXZ(x, z)
RZ(z)
≤ r
}
≤ ε
}
be the conditional inf-spectral entropy relative to RZ ∈ P(Z).
The following two lemmas relate the quantities
Hεmin(PXZ |RZ) and Hεs (PXZ |RZ).
Lemma 3: For PXZ ∈ P(X × Z) and RZ ∈ P(Z), we
have
H¯
ε/2
min(PXZ |RZ) ≥ H
ε
s (PXZ |RZ).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Lemma 4: For PXZ ∈ P(X × Z), we have
Hεmin(PXZ |PZ) ≤ H
ε+ζ
s (PXZ |PZ)− log ζ
for any 0 < ζ ≤ 1− ε.
Proof: See Appendix C.
From Theorem 1, Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we have the
following.
Theorem 2: For any 0 < η ≤ ε and 0 < ζ ≤ 1 − ε, we
have
max
RZ∈P(Z)
Hε−ηs (PXZ |RZ) + log 4η
2 − 1
≤ ℓ(PXZ , ε)
≤ Hε+ζs (PXZ |PZ)− log ζ.
D. Gaussian Approximation
In this section, we consider the asymptotic setting. By
applying the Berry-Esse´en theorem to Theorem 2, we have
the following Gaussian approximation of ℓ(PnXZ , ε).
Theorem 3: Let
V (X |Z) :=
∑
x,z
PXZ(x, z)
(
log
1
PX|Z(x|z)
−H(X |Z)
)2
be the dispersion of the conditional log likelihood. Then, we
have
ℓ(PnXZ , ε) = nH(X |Z) +
√
nV (X |Z)Φ−1(ε) +O(log n),
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard Gaussian random variable.
E. Exponential Bound
In this section, we review the exponential bounds.
Definition 3: For PXZ ∈ P(X × Z), let
φ(ρ|PXZ) = log
∑
z
PZ(z)
(∑
x
PX|Z(x|z)
1
1−ρ
)1−ρ
.
We have the following.
Theorem 4 ([7]): For any 0 < ρ ≤ 12 , we have
EF [d(F |PXZ)] ≤
3
2
|S|ρeφ(ρ|PXZ).
Definition 4: For θ > 0, PXZ ∈ P(X × Z), and RZ ∈
P(Z), let
H1+θ(PXZ |RZ) := −
1
θ
log
∑
x,z
RZ(z)
(
PXZ(x, z)
RZ(z)
)1+θ
be the conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 1+θ relative to RZ .
For θ = 0, we define
H1(PXZ |RZ) := lim
θ→0
H1+θ(PXZ |RZ)
= H(X |Z)−D(PZ‖RZ).
By using Jensen’s inequality and by setting ρ = θ1+θ , we
have
φ(ρ|PXZ ) ≤ −
θ
1 + θ
H1+θ(PXZ |PZ).
Thus, we have the following slightly looser bound.
Corollary 3: For 0 < θ ≤ 1, we have
EF [d(F |PXZ)] ≤
3
2
|S|
θ
1+θ e−
θ
1+θH1+θ(PXZ |PZ).
From Theorem 4 and Corollary 3, we have the following.
Theorem 5: We have
ℓ(PXZ , ε)
≥ sup
0<ρ≤ 12
−φ(ρ|PXZ) + log(2ε/3)
ρ
− 1 (2)
≥ sup
0<θ≤1
θH1+θ(PXZ |PZ) + (1 + θ) log(2ε/3)
θ
− 1.(3)
III. HYBRID BOUND
In this section, we derive another bound from the leftover
hash lemma (Lemma 1). A basic idea is to use the smoothing
in a similar manner as in the derivation of Theorem 4.
However, we do not use the large deviation bound.
Theorem 6: For any 0 < η ≤ ε, we have
ℓ(PXZ , ε)
≥ max
0≤θ≤1
max
RZ
[θH1+θ(PXZ |RZ)
+ (1− θ)Hε−ηs (PXZ |RZ)] + log 4η
2 − 1. (4)
Proof: We define the smoothed probability
P¯XZ(x, z) = PXZ(x, z)1
[
− log
PXZ(x, z)
RZ(z)
> r
]
. (5)
From Lemma 1, we have
EF
[
d(F |P¯XZ)
]
≤
√
|S|e−H2(P¯XZ |Rz)
=
√√√√|S|∑
x,z
P¯XZ(x, z)2
RZ(z)
≤
√√√√|S|∑
x,z
PXZ(x, z)1+θ
RZ(z)θ
e−(1−θ)r
=
√
|S|
∑
x,z
e−θH1+θ(PXZ |RZ)−(1−θ)r.
By the triangular inequality, we have
EF
[
d(F |P¯XZ)
]
≤ 2d(PXZ , P¯XZ) +
1
2
√
|S|e−θH1+θ(PXZ |RZ)−(1−θ)r
= PXZ
{
− log
PXZ(x, z)
RZ(z)
≤ r
}
+
1
2
√
|S|e−θH1+θ(PXZ |RZ)−(1−θ)r.
Thus, by setting r = Hε−ηs (PXZ |RZ) and by taking |S| so
that
1
2
√
|S|e−θH1+θ(PXZ |RZ)−(1−θ)r ≤ η,
we have the statement of the theorem.
Note that the bound in Theorem 6 interpolates the lower
bound in Theorem 2 and the bound in Eq. (3) of Theorem 5.
More specifically, when the supremum in Eq. (4) is achieved
by θ = 0, then the bound in Eq. (4) reduces to the bound in
Theorem 2. To derive the bound in Eq. (3), we need some
large deviation calculation. By using Markov’s inequality, we
have
PXZ
{
− log
PXZ(x, z)
RZ(z)
≤ r
}
= PXZ
{
θ log
PXZ(x, z)
RZ(z)
≥ −θr
}
≤ exp {θr − θH1+θ(PXZ |RZ)} .
Thus, we have
Hε−ηs (PXZ |RZ) ≥ H1+θ(PXZ |RZ) +
1
θ
log(ε− η). (6)
By setting η = ε3 , RZ = PZ , and by substituting Eq. (6) into
Eq. (4), we have the bound in Eq. (3).
In [17], the optimal choice of RZ was shown to be
RZ(z) =
(∑
x PXZ(x, z)
1+θ
) 1
1+θ∑
z (
∑
x PXZ(x, z)
1+θ)
1
1+θ
. (7)
Remark 2: To derive the bound in Eq. (2), we need to
use more complicated bounding. To derive a non-asymptotic
bound that subsume the bound in Eq. (2), we need to intro-
duce more artificial quantities instead of H1+θ(PXZ |RZ) and
Hε−ηs (PXZ |RZ).
IV. NUMERICAL CALCULATION
In this section, we consider the i.i.d. setting. We consider
the case such that Z is obtained from X throughout BSC, i.e.,
PXZ(x, x) =
1− q
2
, PXZ(x, x+ 1) =
q
2
. (8)
In this case, since PZ is the uniform distribution on {0, 1},
from Eq. (7), the optimal choice of RZ is RZ = PZ . We have
PnXZ
{
− logPnX|Z(x
n|zn) ≤ r
}
= B
(
n, q,
r + n log(1− q)
log 1−qq
)
,
where B(n, q, k) is the cumulative density function of the
binomial trial. Thus, the lower and upper bounds in Theorem
2 can be described as
ℓs,low(ε) ≤ ℓ(P
n
XZ , ε) ≤ ℓs,up(ε),
where
ℓs,low(ε) = B
−1(n, q, ε− η)× log
1− q
q
− n log(1 − q) + log 4η2 − 1 (9)
ℓs,up(ε) = B
−1(n, q, ε+ ζ)× log
1− q
q
− n log(1 − q)− log ζ (10)
For the distribution of the form in Eq. (8), the bound in
Eqs. (2) and (3) coincide. We have
H1+θ(PXZ |PZ) = −
1
θ
log
(
q1+θ + (1− q)1+θ
)
.
Thus, the bounds in Theorem 5 can be described as
ℓ(PnXZ , ε) ≥ ℓe,low(ε),
where
ℓe,low(ε) = sup
0<θ≤1
−n log
(
q1+θ + (1− q)1+θ
)
θ
+
(1 − θ)
θ
log(2ε/3)− 1 (11)
Similarly, the bound in Theorem 6 can be described as
ℓ(PnXZ , ε) ≥ ℓh,low(ε),
where
ℓh,low(ε)
= max
0≤θ≤1
[
−n log
(
q1+θ + (1 − q)1+θ
)
+ (1− θ)
×
{
B−1 (n, q, ε− η)× log
1− q
q
− n log(1− q)
}]
+ log 4η2 − 1. (12)
For ε = 10−10 and q = 0.11, we plot ℓs,low(ε), ℓs,up(ε),
ℓe,low(ε), ℓh,low(ε), and Gaussian approximation derived by
Theorem 3 in Fig. 1, where we set η = ζ = ε2 . From the
figure, we can find that the exponential bound is better than
the min-entropy bound up to about n = 10000. The hybrid
bound is better than both the exponential bound and the min-
entropy bound. The Gaussian approximation overestimate the
lower bounds, but it is sandwiched by the lower bounds and
the upper bound.
In Figs. 2, 3 and 4, the bounds are compared from a different
perspective, i.e., for fixed n and varying ε. From the figures,
we can find that the exponential bound and the hybrid bound
become much better than the min-entropy bound as ε becomes
small. When ε is rather large for n, the min-entropy bound is
better than the exponential bound. The hybrid bound is better
than both the exponential bound and the min-entropy bound
for whole ranges of ε.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have compared the exponential bound
and the min-entropy bound. It turned out that the exponential
bound is better than the min-entropy bound when ε is rather
small for n. When ε is rather large for n, the min-entropy
bound is better than the exponential bound. We also presented
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Fig. 1. A comparison among the bounds for ε = 10−10 and q = 0.11.
The blue curve is the min-entropy bound ℓs,low(ε). The black curve is the
exponential bound ℓe,low(ε). The red curve is the hybrid bound ℓh,low(ε).
The dashed pink curve is the Gaussian approximation. The green curve is the
upper bound ℓs,up(ε).
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Fig. 2. A comparison among the bounds for n = 1000 and q = 0.11.
The blue curve is the min-entropy bound ℓs,low(ε). The black curve is the
exponential bound ℓe,low(ε). The red curve is the hybrid bound ℓh,low(ε).
The green curve is the upper bound ℓs,up(ε).
the hybrid bound that interpolates the exponential bound and
the min-entropy bound.
For a future research agenda, it is important to extend the
results in this paper to the quantum setting or other information
theoretic security tasks such as the wire-tap channel.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
Let P˜SZ ∈ Bε(PSZ) be such that
Hεmin(PSZ |RZ) = Hmin(P˜SZ |RZ).
Then, we define
P˜XZ(x, z) = P˜SZ(f(x), z)
PXZ(x, z)
PSZ(f(x), z)
.
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Fig. 3. A comparison among the bounds for n = 10000 and q = 0.11.
The blue curve is the min-entropy bound ℓs,low(ε). The black curve is the
exponential bound ℓe,low(ε). The red curve is the hybrid bound ℓh,low(ε).
The green curve is the upper bound ℓs,up(ε).
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Fig. 4. A comparison among the bounds for n = 100000 and q = 0.11.
The blue curve is the min-entropy bound ℓs,low(ε). The black curve is the
exponential bound ℓe,low(ε). The red curve is the hybrid bound ℓh,low(ε).
The green curve is the upper bound ℓs,up(ε).
Then, we have
d(P˜XZ , PXZ)
=
1
2
∑
x,z
|P˜XZ(x, z)− PXZ(x, z)|
=
1
2
∑
s,z
∑
x∈f−1(s)
PXZ(x, z)
PSZ(s, z)
|P˜SZ(s, z)− PSZ(s, z)|
=
1
2
∑
s,z
|P˜SZ(s, z)− PSZ(s, z)|
= d(P˜SZ , PSZ)
≤ ε.
Thus, we have P˜XZ ∈ Bε(PXZ). Furthermore, by the con-
struction of P˜XZ , we have P˜XZ(x, z) ≤ P˜SZ(f(x), z) for
every (x, z). Thus, we have
Hεmin(PSZ |RZ) = Hmin(P˜SZ |RZ)
≤ Hmin(P˜XZ |RZ)
≤ Hεmin(PXZ |RZ).
B. Proof of Lemma 3
Let r = Hεs (PXZ |RZ). Then, let
P¯XZ(x, z) = PXZ(x, z)1
[
− log
PXZ(x, z)
RZ(z)
> r
]
.
Then, we have
d(PXZ , P¯XZ) ≤
ε
2
.
Thus, we have P¯XZ ∈ B¯ε/2. Thus, we have
H¯
ε/2
min(PXZ |RZ) ≥ Hmin(P¯XZ |RZ)
≥ r
= Hεs (PXZ |RZ).
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Let r and P˜XZ be such that r = Hmin(P˜XZ |PZ) =
Hεmin(PXZ |PZ). For arbitrary fixed δ > 0, let
T =
{
(x, z) :
PXZ(x, z)
PZ(z)
≤ e−r+δ
}
and
Tz = {x : (x, z) ∈ T } .
Then, we have |T cz | ≤ er−δ. Furthermore, we have
d(PXZ , P˜XZ) ≥ PXZ(T
c)− P˜XZ(T
c)
= PXZ(T
c)−
∑
z
∑
x∈T cz
P˜XZ(x, z)
≥ PXZ(T
c)−
∑
z
∑
x∈T cz
e−rPZ(z)
≥ PXZ(T
c)− e−δ.
Thus, we have
r − δ
≤ sup
{
r′ : PXZ
{
− log
PXZ(x, z)
PZ(z)
≤ r′
}
≤ ε+ e−δ
}
= Hε+e
−δ
s (PXZ |PZ),
which implies
Hεmin(PXZ |PZ) ≤ H
ε+e−δ
s (PXZ |PZ) + δ
= Hε+ζs (PXZ |PZ)− log ζ.
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